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FOREWORD:
FAULT IN AMERICAN CONTRACT LAW
Omri Ben-Shahar*
Ariel Porat**
Introduction
The basic rule of liability in tort law is fault. The basic rule of liability in
contract law is no fault. This is perhaps one of the most striking divides
within private law, the most important difference between the law of voluntary and nonvoluntary obligations. It is this fault line (speaking equivocally)
that the present Symposium explores. Is it a real divide—two opposite
branches of liability within private law—or is it merely a rhetorical myth?
How can it be justified?
As law-and-economics scholars, this fault/no-fault divide between contract and tort is all the more puzzling. In law and economics, legal rules are
understood as incentives, evaluated within a framework in which parties
take actions to prevent different types of loss. Tortfeasors can take measures
to avoid accidents; contracting parties can take measures to avoid loss from
breach. The context of the loss can diverge between contract and tort—
accidents to strangers versus harm to a known breached-against party—but
the underlying framework of incentives is similar, if not identical. Robert
Cooter famously described this underlying framework as a unified “model
1
of precaution,” and Richard Craswell showed how to think of the breach-orperform decision as a problem of precaution, mirroring the framework of
2
tort law. Thus, to those of us who take the idea of a unified model seriously,
a significant puzzle looms large: if these two branches of law share the same
underlying framework, why do they follow different liability regimes?
To be sure, the unified model takes a very general view of tort and contract. But the divergence puzzle is all the more challenging when we
increase the resolution of our view and compare some of the main tort and
contract doctrines, only to find again a clear divide. For example, tort law
has a substantial causation requirement, but causation is seldom an issue in
contract. Tort law recognizes claims for punitive damages; contract law by
*
School.
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1. Robert Cooter, Unity in Tort, Contract, and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 Cal.
L. Rev. 1 (1985).
2. Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of Efficient Breach,
61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 629 (1988); Richard Craswell, Precontractual Investigation as an Optimal Precaution Problem, 17 J. Legal Stud. 401 (1988).
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and large does not. Contract law limits the magnitude of recovery through
doctrines like foreseeability and certainty; tort law mainly employs proximate cause and duty of care, which limit liability in a different way. And the
list continues: economic harm (common in contract but not in tort), nonpecuniary losses (common in tort but much less in contract), comparative fault
(applied as a defense in tort but not in contract), and mitigation of damages
(common in contract, not in tort).
It would take more than one symposium to explain the puzzling interface between contract and tort. Any explanation, though, would have to
begin with an account of the limited role that fault plays in contract law.
This breaks down to separate lines of inquiry: (1) Should lack of fault be a
defense against breach? Should the breaching party be able to escape liability if he can show that he worked hard to avoid breach? (2) Should fault be
an aggravating factor multiplying damages? Should the breaching party be
liable for more than normal damages if breach was “malicious”? (3) Should
contract law take the aggrieved party’s fault into account? These three lines
of questions—the no-fault defense, the willful-breach multiplier, and contributory fault—are the focus of the present Symposium.
I. A Positive Account
The first thing that an account of “fault in contract law” needs to do is to
separate myth from reality and identify the extent to which fault does, or
does not, play a role in contract liability. Almost every article in this collection contributes some descriptive nuance to the fault picture. At one end of
the spectrum, Melvin Eisenberg argues that contract law is substantially a
fault regime, manifested in areas like unconscionability, unexpected circum3
stances, interpretation, mistake, and nonperformance. In all these areas,
fault plays an important role, and liability depends to a large extent on the
parties’ blameworthiness. Consistent with this descriptive line, Richard
Epstein demonstrates that in many consensual relations, fault is built into the
liability rule through a subtle definition of the content of the promise. Taking bailment as the prototype, he shows that the generic understanding of a
4
promise is to take due care, not to guarantee a result. George Cohen, who in
the past argued that fault plays a dominant role in contract damages, argues
in this Symposium that it also plays an important role in other areas, like
mistake, impracticability, misunderstanding, interpretation, and formation of
5
contracts.
At the other end, other contributors highlight the strict-liability side of
contract law. Robert Scott, for example, argues that case law is largely con-

3. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Role of Fault in Contract Law: Unconscionability, Unexpected
Circumstances, Interpretation, Mistake, and Nonperformance, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1413 (2009).
4. Richard A. Epstein, The Many Faces of Fault in Contract Law: Or How to Do Economics Right, Without Really Trying, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1461 (2009).
5. George M. Cohen, The Fault that Lies Within Our Contract Law, 107 Mich. L. Rev.
1445 (2009).
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sistent with the idea that the promisor’s liability does not vary with his degree of fault. Willfulness of breach, he claims, is not an aggravating factor,
6
despite some famous statements to the contrary in case law. Richard Posner
argues that the Holmesian notion that an option to breach and pay damages
is embedded in a contractual promise necessarily implies that liability is
7
strict. “It wouldn’t make any sense,” he argues, “to excuse you just because
the cost of performance would exceed the benefits, for that would make the
8
option nugatory.”
Between these poles, other contributors highlight additional contours of
the fault doctrine and how it infiltrates contract law. In support of the nofault-as-defense prong, Eric Posner identifies a broad set of cases in which
promisors who are able to show that breach occurred with no fault of their
9
own would escape liability. Ariel Porat explores the presence of a comparative fault defense—cases in which promisors who are able to show that
harm could have been avoided efficiently by promisees even before a breach
10
took place would escape liability, either in full or in part. Saul Levmore
suggests that the law actually allows parties to vary the scope of the comparative fault component embodied in the mitigation defense. He argues that
parties who draft liquidated damage clauses do more than fix the magnitude
of recovery—they opt out of the fault-based mitigation duties. Levmore also
11
explores the pros and cons of such an opt-out.
A glimpse into continental European legal systems makes the “fault in
contract law” puzzle even more mysterious. Stefan Grundmann, a leading
authority in comparative contract law, provides a compelling doctrinal journey through the ways the law merges both fault and strict liability. His
discussion demonstrates that although fault plays a role in contractual liability, this role varies significantly between common law and the civil law
prevalent in continental Europe: in fact, fault is often a condition to any imposition of contractual liability in European law. Fault has also varied over
time in European law, with more recent reforms aimed at bolstering its
12
role.

6. Robert E. Scott, In (Partial) Defense of Strict Liability in Contract, 107 Mich. L. Rev.
1381 (2009).
7.
(2009).

Richard A. Posner, Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1349

8.

Id. at 1351.

9.

Eric A. Posner, Fault in Contract Law, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1431 (2009).

10.
(2009).

Ariel Porat, A Comparative Fault Defense in Contract Law, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1397

11. Saul Levmore, Stipulated Damages, Super-Strict Liability, and Mitigation in Contract
Law, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1365 (2009).
12. Stefan Grundmann, The Fault Principle as the Chameleon of Contract Law: A Market
Function Approach, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1583 (2009).
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II. A Normative and Historical Account
The Symposium provides a detailed depiction of the fault/no-fault divide
and a distilled descriptive understanding to the role of fault in contract. But
even after highlighting the many faces of fault in contract law, it is all the
more clear that the role of fault is limited. The primary ambition of this
Symposium, then, is to inquire into the reasons why fault plays no more
than a limited role and why it infiltrated some contract law doctrines, and
perhaps to debate whether a bigger role for fault than it is currently accorded
would be justified.
An explanation for the limited place of fault in contract, compared to its
robust place in tort, begins with a historical account. Two contributions provide new insights into why English common law treated fault differently in
tort and contract. Roy Kreitner argues that fault standards were historically
considered to be socially imposed, thus inconsistent with the basic premise
of contract law that the parties, not society, are the ones who create the content of the obligation. He also shows how the blurring of the contract/tort
line in the area of products liability blurred the fault/no-fault distinction
13
within each field. Richard Epstein explores the origins of bailment law as a
species of consensual obligation law and argues that the fault standard prevailed in it (and in other types of contractual arrangements) through the
14
definition of the duty owed by one party to another.
The normative question with respect to the role of fault in contract law
breaks down, as we suggest, to several separate inquiries: the role of willful
breach, whether lack of fault should be a defense to breach, and whether
comparative fault should come into play.
A. Willful Breach
Three separate contributions, by Richard Craswell, by Peter Siegelman
and Steve Thel, and by Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, address willful
breach, which is one of the more puzzling fault-based pockets in contract
law. All three contributions provide justifications for the law’s occasional
harsher treatment of willful breach. They argue that what constitutes “willful” or “malicious” breach cannot be determined conceptually, but rather has
to be the conclusion of the analysis that identifies situations in which normal
damages are not high enough. There are occasions, these articles argue, in
which normal damages do not suffice to create optimal deterrence and a
damage booster is need. These occasions have nothing to do with the mens
rea of the promisor, the volition of his act, or its morality. They surely cannot be explained by reference to an infringement of the “sanctity of
contract.” Instead, the willful-breach cases have to do with incentives.
In the first of these three contributions, Craswell argues that the willfulbreach add-on to damages can be explained in two ways. Higher damages
13.

Roy Kreitner, Fault at the Contract-Tort Interface, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1533 (2009).

14.

Epstein, supra note 4.
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are awarded when breach is clearly inefficient, or are awarded when normal
damages are undercompensatory and do not provide enough incentive to
15
perform. Another willful-breach rationale is developed by Siegelman and
Thel, who argue that higher damages are necessary when the social costs of
avoiding breach are zero. They use the notorious example of breach in order
to sell to a higher bidder as an example of a case in which there is no social
16
cost to breach avoidance. Finally, Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar develop an exante view of willful breach. They argue that willful breach is often an indication of a systematic pattern of “nasty” but undetectable behavior, having
to do with some failure by the promisor to make earlier investments in performance capacity. The damage increase is needed to deter such propensity
17
and its subsequent mesh of subperformance conduct.
While these contributions are primarily normative, seeking justifications
for the willful-breach rule, they also provide a more lucid picture of what
types of conduct are considered willful under existing contract law. Collected here together, they provide the first attempt within law and economics
to reconcile the perceived conflict between the notion of efficient breach and
the doctrine of willful breach that has an eclectic appearance in case law.
B. The No-Fault Defense
A pure fault-based liability rule would allow breaching parties to escape
liability whenever it is established that the breach was not due to their fault.
Eric Posner presents a strong case for such a fault rule. In his view, when the
negligence determination by courts is not difficult (administrative and error
costs are low), a fault rule could be superior to a strict liability rule. A fault
rule saves transaction costs because under such a rule the breaching party
does not insure the victim for inadvertent risks. Conversely, under a strict
liability rule, such insurance is forced on the victim, even though there is no
18
reason for the victim to buy such insurance in the first place.
An opposite view, expressed by Richard Posner and by Robert Scott, is
that fault is not, and also should not be, relevant to contractual liability, either as a no-fault defense or as a super-fault damage booster. According to
these two prominent writers, the Anglo-American contract law is efficient
19
and should remain the way it is.
From a completely different perspective—of philosophy rather than of
law and economics—Seana Shiffrin examines whether a deliberate breach
of contract is a moral wrong. As opposed to those who argue that fault
15. Richard Craswell, When Is a Willful Breach “Willful”? The Link Between Definitions
and Damages, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1501 (2009).
16. Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, Willfulness Versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense of Willful Breach Doctrine, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1517 (2009).
17. Oren Bar-Gill & Omri Ben-Shahar, An Information Theory of Willful Breach, 107 Mich.
L. Rev. 1479 (2009).
18.

Posner, supra note 9.

19.

Posner, supra note 7; Scott, supra note 6.
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should not matter at all (like Richard Posner and Scott), and in contrast to
the argument that no-fault breaches should (under certain conditions) be
excused regardless of whether those breaches were deliberate or not (like
Eric Posner), Shiffrin takes the position that breach of a promise can be a
moral wrong regardless of its efficiency. Her position is that parties who
value performance as an end would not always permit willful breach, even if
20
efficient. Richard Posner dissents. He argues that legal duties do not overlap with moral duties and points out that even Shiffrin would not argue that
21
if breach is not morally wrong it should be excused.
Continuing his previous dialogue with Shiffrin on the role of morality in
22
contractual liability, Steven Shavell argues that efficient breach merely
mimics what a complete contract would have stipulated. When the contingency that eventuated and led to the breach of the contract was not explicitly
addressed by the contract, the breach coupled with a payment of full expectation damages is not a violation of a promise. In Shavell’s view, the reason
why many individuals hold the belief that a breach is immoral is their mistaken perception that a contract is a simple set of promises, ignoring the fact
that contracts are incomplete and that it is the parties’ intent that their contract be supplemented with a nuanced understanding of the obligations. The
popular view the breach is immoral—so the argument goes—confuses the
23
breach of a contract with the breaking of an explicit promise.
C. The Comparative Fault Factor
A third question regarding the role of fault in contract law relates to the
victim, rather than to the breaching party: should the promisee’s fault matter—should contributory negligence or comparative fault be a defense in
contract law? Porat advocates for a comparative fault defense in contract
law in cases when the victim inefficiently failed to cooperate or to avoid
overreliance, and when such cooperation or avoidance of overreliance was
of low cost. When the defense applies, damages to the victim should be re24
duced, to reflect his comparative fault. Robert Scott has a different view on
that matter. He argues that promisee’s incentives to cooperate are provided
either by reputational sanctions or by norms of reciprocity. Therefore a con25
tributory or comparative fault defense is not required. Richard Posner,
although not addressing the question directly, seems to imply that fault of
both parties to the contract is generally irrelevant to liability, unless their

20.

Seana Shiffrin, Could Breach of Contract Be Immoral?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1551 (2009).

21.

Posner, supra note 7, at 1363.

22. Steven Shavell, Is Breach of Contract Immoral?, 56 Emory L.J. 439 (2006); Seana
Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L. Rev. 708 (2007).
23. Steven Shavell, Why Breach of Contract May Not Be Immoral Given the Incompleteness
of Contracts, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1569 (2009).
24.

Porat, supra note 10.

25.

Scott, supra note 6, at 1394.
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26

behavior is opportunistic. In contrast, Eric Posner, while presenting an argument for a fault-based liability, suggests that in order to solve the
promisee’s overreliance problem, a rule of contributory negligence should
27
be applied.
III. Parties’ Power to Opt In or Out
A distinctive feature of contract law is that its rules can be varied by parties. This applies also to its fault doctrines, most of which are default rules.
What does this teach us about the role of fault? Can the parties change the
background rules and render fault more relevant to assignment of liability?
One way to increase the relevance of fault is to create islands of no-fault
immunity, effectively saying that the promisor is not liable for breach unless
it is his fault. This is often done through force majeure and “best efforts”
clauses.
Alternatively, in the presence of doctrines that make fault relevant, the
parties may want to write contracts that shrink the relevance of fault. For
example, the parties may want to use contracts to waive some types of faultbased tort liability. Well-known legal rules bar some such waivers, rendering
them presumptively unconscionable. But Richard Posner demonstrates a
situation in which the parties can waive fault-based tort liability for precon28
tractual fraud. Levmore identifies another way to make fault less relevant,
arguing that parties writing liquidated damage clauses are in effect opting
out of the mitigation doctrine. He suggests that liquidated damages create a
super-strict liability regime, eliminating some of the comparative fault sub29
tleties of the mitigation doctrine. Finally, Scott points to empirical data
indicating that sophisticated parties often incorporate clauses into their contracts in an attempt to eliminate fault-based interpretation of their contracts
30
and adopt instead strict liability-type rules.
Conclusion
With fault having a variety of roles in contract law, is there truly a
tort/contract dichotomy based on a fault/no-fault line? With products liability sitting on the interface between tort and sales law, is there any room for
separate doctrinal grounds for liability? In the end, was Cooter right—can
the two fields be regarded as unified, not only in economic theory, but also
in the basis for liability? Against two traditions that provide clear answers—
a doctrinal tradition of clear but rigid distinctions between tort and contract,
and a law-and-economics tradition of ignoring the differences between the

26.

Posner, supra note 7.

27.

See Posner, supra note 9, at 1436.

28.

Posner, supra note 7, at 1357.

29.

Levmore, supra note 11, at 1378.

30.

Scott, supra note 6, at 1395.
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two fields—we hope that the contribution of this Symposium is in blurring
the answers while portraying a more interesting picture.

